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1. US questions Lie's action and motives--According to Stettinius, the US delegation to the Security Council regards the "unsolicited" communication to the Council on 16 April by Secretary-General Lie as an "extremely dubious practice" and as "drafted with other than purely legal considerations in mind."

Qavam's explanations. On 15 April Qavam sought to explain to Embassy Tehran the circumstances which resulted in his instructions to Ambassador Ala to request the withdrawal of Iran's case. According to Qavam, the Soviet Ambassador, having learned of Ala's new instructions to leave the matter for the Council's decision, protested these instructions as "illogical" because Iran was professing confidence in the Soviet evacuation but at the same time was not following the Soviet course in asking the Council to drop the Iranian complaint. Qavam disputed this view on the grounds that the Soviets had originally qualified their promise of withdrawal by the phrase "if nothing unforeseen occurred." The Soviet Ambassador declared that this qualification was imposed (a) before Iranian-Soviet agreement, and (b) when it seemed that "elements hostile to the USSR might force out Qavam." He added that these conditions no longer existed. The Soviet Ambassador also gave Qavam new assurances that the USSR would use its influence with the Azerbaijanis to keep Azerbaijani demands within limits acceptable to Qavam. Qavam accordingly yielded to Soviet pressure and directed Ala to join in the request to drop Iran's case.

(According to Qavam's Propaganda Minister, "preliminary and indirect" negotiations with the Azerbaijanis are under way and the Tehran Government hopes that an Azerbaijani delegation will arrive at Karaj soon. US Consul Tabriz reports that he observed joint Red Army-Azerbaijani maneuvers in the hills south of Tabriz on 16 April.)

Iranian policy. Firuz, Propaganda Minister and pro-Soviet Under Secretary of Qavam's office, and Homayunjah, Foreign Office Under Secretary, both have offered to Embassy Tehran their reasons for Iran's current appeasement policy towards the USSR. Firuz insisted that Iran (a) was trying to serve the cause of world peace and "save her own skin," (b) considered the support of the western powers "absolutely essential," but (c) had its "head in the bear's mouth." He added that if UNO was prepared to guarantee Iran against the USSR,

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"that would be a different story." The Foreign Office Under Secretary said Iranian policy is based primarily on the necessity of avoiding anything which could give the USSR an excuse to allege that Iran is in any way unfriendly. Iran thus hopes to "disarm" the Soviet Government by accepting "false Soviet assertions" and to evoke greater world support by "showing up" the Soviets.

2. Soviet interest in Spitzbergen and Bear Island--The Norwegian Ambassador in Washington has informed the State Department that the Soviets have recently emphasized to the Norwegian envoy in Moscow their continued interest in an agreement for joint Norwegian-Soviet defense of Spitzbergen and Bear Island (midway between Spitzbergen and Norway).
3. President Truman seeks cooperation of Egyptian King in air agreement--US Minister Cairo has been instructed to present to the King of Egypt the following views of President Truman: (a) the conclusion of pending US-Egyptian air agreements is a matter "of the utmost importance" to the US, (b) Egyptian opposition to US air traffic between Cairo and Lydda is the main unresolved point, and (c) "restricted" interim military rights, desired by the US, do not necessitate retention in Egypt of US military personnel. The President urges the King to remove the remaining obstacles to agreement.
4. CINCPAC opposes full citizenship for Guam's natives at this time, because they are not yet capable of assuming all the responsibilities of self-government. He believes that unless the natives retain special status, the preservation of their rights and interests will be jeopardized by the presence on Guam of "a numerically predominant population of mainland citizens which is expected to attain the ratio of 4 to 1."

EUROPE-AFRICA

5. POLAND: US asks reaffirmation of Polish election pledge--The State Department has authorized Ambassador Lane to inform the Polish Government that (a) the recent referendum proposal and postponement of elections until the fall [redacted] have cast doubt on the Polish Government's intention to fulfill the Yalta and Potsdam agreements concerning Polish elections; (b) any departure

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from the letter and spirit of these agreements would have a "most unfortunate" effect on US-Polish relationships; and (c) it would be highly desirable for the Polish Government to issue an immediate public reaffirmation of its intention to hold elections this year, incorporating the exact wording of the Potsdam pledge for free participation by all democratic parties.

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6. FINLAND: Cabinet delegation to visit Moscow--Minister Hamilton has been informed by Finnish Foreign Minister Enckell that the Prime Minister and three Cabinet members plan to leave for Moscow on 17 April (two other Cabinet members are already there). Enckell stated that the mission (a) had not been invited by the Soviets, (b) wished to discuss general questions relating to the peace treaty before formal receipt of definite proposals and (c) would probably not discuss the question of a Soviet-Finnish military alliance.
 7. USSR: Smith's views on Soviet-Argentine relations--Ambassador Smith agrees with Charge Cabot in Buenos Aires that a Soviet-Argentine rapprochement is a complicated matter for the Soviets as well as for Argentina [redacted] Smith believes that (a) the Soviets consider Buenos Aires the most desirable location for a "political beachhead" from which to neutralize US influence in the Western Hemisphere, but (b) they fear that the inconsistency between their anti-Franco stand and a Soviet-Argentine rapprochement would be exploited by anti-Soviet propagandists. He anticipates, however, early resumption of full diplomatic relations between the two countries provided (a) Peron does not set too high a price and (b) Soviet steps in that direction do not seriously antagonize world opinion. Smith concludes that resumption of relations would not mean wholehearted Soviet cooperation with Peron but would be followed by attempts to undermine the Peron regime.
 8. FRANCE: Political crisis reaches climax--Caffery reports that the crisis over the nature of the new Constitution has reached a climax. If, as appears imminent, the MRP Party breaks with the leftist parties over this issue, its representatives almost certainly will withdraw from the Gouin Cabinet, and will leave the Government to a Socialist-Communist coalition.

The French Confederation of Labor (CGT), according to Caffery, openly demonstrated in its recently concluded Congress that

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it has become an "instrument of the Kremlin." (The CGT claims a membership of 5,500,000 workers.) Caffery adds that while the entire CGT machinery is directed by the Communist Party, the position of the rank and file is confused.

9. SPAIN: Franco stronger, oppositionists discouraged--Embassy Madrid reports that the internal effect of the Polish action against Spain before the Security Council, like earlier international pressures, has been to increase popular support of the regime. Moderate opposition elements, including both Monarchists and Republicans, are feeling a "profound discouragement."

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